Tailoring Globalization to Reduce Global Poverty and Inequality: a Case Study of the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral Textile Agreement by Howell, Jimmy
International Journal of Legal Information
the Official Journal of the International Association of Law Libraries
Volume 33
Issue 3 Winter 2005 Article 6
1-1-2005
Tailoring Globalization to Reduce Global Poverty
and Inequality: a Case Study of the U.S.-
Cambodian Bilateral Textile Agreement
Jimmy Howell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ijli
The International Journal of Legal Information is produced by The International Association of Law
Libraries.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Journal of Legal Information by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howell, Jimmy (2005) "Tailoring Globalization to Reduce Global Poverty and Inequality: a Case Study of the U.S.-Cambodian
Bilateral Textile Agreement," International Journal of Legal Information: Vol. 33: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ijli/vol33/iss3/6
 418 
 
 
Tailoring Globalization to Reduce Global Poverty and 
Inequality: a Case Study of the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral 
Textile Agreement 
 
 
 
 
JIMMY HOWELL* 
 
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization has done little to fight global poverty and inequality.1 
Though some critics have used this fact to argue against global economic 
integration,2 this article explains that those in favor of a freer and fairer global 
trade and finance system must link that regime with labor rights in order to 
                                                 
 * Jimmy Howell is in his third and final year of the J.D. program at American 
University's Washington College of Law.  He is concurrently enrolled in an ABA-
cooperative program earning a D.E.J.E.I. (Diplôme des études juridiques européennes 
et internationales) at the Université de Paris-X. In the fall of 2006, he will be an 
associate at the law firm Thompson Hine, LLP.  The author would like to thank 
several people who were involved with the writing of this article. First and foremost 
is Tonya Keusseyan who offered advice, encouragement, and humor at every step of 
the writing process. I thank Professor Jerome Levinson for inspiring me to study 
“legal architectures” in the field of international trade and finance. As well as my 
parents Jim and Debbie Howell for their support. Finally, I am grateful to Professor 
Tom Sargentich who always encouraged curiosity into the role of law and 
government in our daily lives. I hope this article makes all of them proud. 
 1 See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2-3 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1999) (studying the relationship between economic integration, 
global poverty, and inequality), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/pdf/hdr_1999_full.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 
2005). The income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the richest 
countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, an increase from 1990 when 
the same ratio was 60 to 1 and 1960 when it was 30 to 1. Id. at 3. The wealthiest 
twenty percent of the world’s population share in eighty-six percent of the world’s 
GDP, while the poorest twenty percent receive only one percent of the world’s GDP. 
Id. at 2.   
 2 See Gijsbert van Liemt, Towards a different kind of globalization, or how the 
anti-globalists view the world, 3-5 (Mar. 2004) (explaining that anti-globalist reasons 
against globalization range from agriculture to cultural identity). 
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achieve a reduction in global poverty and a more equitable distribution of 
trade gains.3 Without this connection, today’s most powerful economies will 
be tomorrow’s least relevant markets, finding themselves subordinate on the 
global supply chain to countries who were once thought of as “lesser 
developed.” This result will not come from increased development from those 
countries. Instead, it will derive from the erosion of progress in leading 
markets initiated by enhanced competition from countries with lower relative 
standards of living. Simply put: without a mechanism to increase those 
standards in the poorest countries, the richest countries will find their own 
standards retrograded in order to remain competitive. Accordingly, legal 
architectures must link free trade and global finance with core worker rights—
or else. 
 
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements hitherto have been the 
most effective means of connecting trade and finance with worker rights.4 
One of the most recent and revolutionary trade deals that have incorporated 
provisions to protect labor rights was the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral Textile 
Agreement (“USCBTA”).5        
 
While this emerging field of international law is of monumental 
importance for advocating for the continued relevance and expansion of 
global economic integration as well as for combating the perils of global 
poverty and inequality, it remains an understudied and misunderstood field.6 
                                                 
 3 Cf. ARNE MELCHIOR ET. AL., GLOBALIZATION AND INEQUALITY: WORLD 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND LIVING STANDARDS, 1960-1998, 1 (Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000) (arguing that globalization has in fact contributed 
to a reduction in global poverty as evidenced by the fact that global inequality as a 
whole has decreased since the 1960s), available at 
http://odin.dep.no/archive/udvedlegg/01/01/rev__016.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
 4 See Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An 
Analytical Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13-15 (Fall 2003) (providing the 
recent historical background of labor provisions appearing in trade agreements 
beginning with the International Trade Organization’s Havana Charter). 
 5 See Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement, Jan. 20, 1999, U.S.-Cambodia 
[hereinafter USCBTA], at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/data/commerce_html/tcc_2/cambodiatextilebilat.html 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2005); see also Press Release, Office of the United States Trade 
Represenative, U.S.-Cambodian Textile Agreement Links Increasing Trade with 
Improving Workers’ Rights (Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter PR: Linking Trade and Labor 
Rights] (celebrating the USCBTA as a unique agreement linking trade incentives with 
labor rights promotion), at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2002/January/U.S.-
Cambodian_Textile_Agreement_Links_Increasing_Trade_with_Improving_Workers'
_Rights.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).  
 6 See generally Making Globalization Work: Expanding the Benefits of 
Globalization to Working Families and the Poor, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
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Fundamental questions arise as to what challenges trade agreements should 
attempt to face, how far states should reach in trying to overcome these 
challenges, which methods states should use in accomplishing treaty goals, to 
what degree two or more states should seek to harmonize domestic social 
practices with those of their trading partners, and how much such trade 
agreements should depend on international principles?7 In an effort to answer 
some of these questions, this article analyzes the goals that the USCBTA 
envisioned and the methods the parties used to achieve them.8  
 
Part I explains the background of the treaty.9 This section begins with 
an historical discussion of the trend to use trade agreements and programs to 
connect economic integration with more intrinsically human issues, such as 
labor rights.10 From there, this section transitions to a discussion of the 
USCBTA and the labor and political problems that it confronted.11 
 
Then, Part II explains how the treaty addresses each of these 
problems and whether the parties are able to achieve the mission that they 
established in the trade agreement.12 This part will highlight the successes and 
failures of the agreement, arguing that while there is a limit to the extent that 
trade agreements can influence domestic labor practices, the USCBTA fell too 
                                                                                                                    
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE INT'L LABOR ORG. (Dec. 2, 2002) 
(surveying the general problems that globalization has been unable to address and 
discussing the possible reasons why globalization has left them unaddressed), at 
http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/comm/events/20021202panel1.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2005). 
 7 See discussion infra Part III (answering the questions that the USCBTA failed 
to address adequately). 
 8 See discussion infra Part II (providing the background behind the treaty, the 
mission it set out to accomplish, and the role of the International Labor Organization 
in helping to ensure substantial compliance in the garment industry with Cambodia’s 
Labor Code). 
 9 See discussion infra Part I (providing the relevant treaty language and 
explaining what the treaty sough to accomplish). 
 10 See discussion infra Part I (placing the treaty’s labor provisions in the context 
of Cambodia’s long history of war and political infighting).  As the labor movement 
has developed, it has remained tethered to the major political parties, which are 
themselves remnants of the conflict between warring domestic factions and 
international enemies. Id. 
 11 See discussion infra Part I (explaining the major labor challenges that the 
USCBTA sought to address, including freedom of association, the right to organize, 
the right to bargain collectively, child labor, working conditions, and employment 
discrimination, among others). 
 12 See discussion infra Part II (examining how the USCBTA confronted the 
challenges described in the background section). 
2005] JIMMY HOWELL  421 
 
short of that boundary to achieve the lasting, high-impact social change that is 
necessary to connect globalization with poverty reduction.13 
 
Part III will elaborate on these commentaries and criticisms.14 This 
section will recommend how drafters of future trade agreements can learn 
from the USCBTA experience, recommending the kind of labor standards that 
future trade agreements should incorporate, how far states should go to 
overcome the particular labor issues, and which methods states should use to 
deal with them.15   
 
II.  BACKGROUND: MAKING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND GLOBAL POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY 
 
A.  THE TREND TO PROTECT LABOR RIGHTS IN TRADE 
AGREEMENTS BEGAN WITH NAFTA    
 
 The USCBTA, an otherwise innocuous textile trade agreement, 
punctuated a decade’s evolution towards incorporating labor rights into the 
international trade and finance regime.16 This evolution began with the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), the multilateral trade 
agreement linking the United States, Canada, and Mexico.17  Accompanying 
NAFTA was a side agreement whose drafters designed it theoretically to 
                                                 
 13 See discussion infra Part II (providing opposing sets of commentary and 
criticism from authoritative observers in an attempt to provide a complete discourse 
on what the treaty was intended to do and what the actual effects were). 
 14 See discussion infra Part III (including issues that the commentary missed). 
This legal field is relatively small. Id.  The discourse is incomplete, which might 
explain why the USCBTA and other treaties have had difficulty in effectuating their 
intended results. Id. 
 15 See discussion infra Part III (arguing that factors like race, class, gender, age, 
and culture complicate the field of trade, finance, and labor in a way that treaty 
negotiators largely ignore).  Ignoring these complexities begs for failure. Id. See also 
Amy Kazmin, Cambodia Makes a Final Break With the Past: Three Decades After 
the “Killing Fields,” the Country is to Join the WTO in an Experiment That Could 
Backfire, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003 (showing that approximately thirty years ago the 
Khmer Rouge murdered anyone with an education); discussion infra Part III (arguing 
that the USCBTA’s mistreatment of the history of ethnic strife is an impediment 
towards a successful protection of labor rights). The USCBTA also ignores that the 
textile industry mostly employs Cambodian women, while the managers and owners 
are foreign men. Id. The treaty misses the race and gender issues as well. Id.       
 16 See Polaski, supra note 4, at 14, 15 (surveying the development of the trend to 
protect labor rights through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties).   
 17 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA], available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=42 (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
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protect core worker rights.18 Unfortunately, the labor side agreement’s 
provisions were so weak as to render it almost meaningless.19   
 
 Despite NAFTA’s failings, the agreement served as a working model 
for continued improvement.20 Labor provisions appeared in 
• the Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation,21  
• the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement,22  
• the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement,23  
• the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral Textile Agreement, and  
• the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.24  
Similar provisions also appeared in unilateral trade preference programs 
including  
• the Generalized System of Preferences,25  
• the Caribbean Basin Initiative,26  
• the African Growth and Opportunity Act,27 and  
                                                 
 18 See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature 
Sept. 8, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) 
[hereinafter NAALC] (protecting, in theory, labor rights through dispute resolution 
panels), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (last visited Mar. 
5, 2005).    
 19 See Mark J. Russo, NAALC: A Tex-Mex Requiem for Labor Protection, 34 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 51, 119 (2002) (arguing that the labor side agreement 
cannot provide effective regulatory development and enforcement of the domestic 
labor laws of each of the NAFTA parties).    
 20 See J.F. HORNBECK, CRS ISSUE BRIEF: THE U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT, (Mar. 5, 2001) (The Clinton Administration emphasized the need for 
future trade agreements to make up for what NAFTA lacked), at 
http://fpc.state.gov/6123.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2005). 
 21 Agreement on Labour Cooperation, Feb. 6, 1997, Can.-Chile, 36 I.L.M. 1213 
[hereinafter Canada-Chile FTA], available at 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/spila/ialc/06Canada_Chile_Agreement.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
 22 Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-
Jordan, 41 I.L.M. 63, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_
5112.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
 23 Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], 
at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset
_upload_file535_3989.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
 24 Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing. [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore 
FTA], at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/
asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf (last visisted Feb. 12, 2005). 
 25 Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2467 (2004).  
 26 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2004).   
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• the Andean Preferences Act.28   
 
B.  HOW THE USCBTA WORKS 
 
The drafters of the USCBTA were able to draw upon these earlier 
agreements and programs to respond to the significant challenges facing the 
labor movement in Cambodia’s textile industry.29 The relevant provision of 
the USCBTA states,  
The Parties seek to create new employment 
opportunities and improve living standards 
and working conditions through an enhanced 
trading relationship; affirm respect for each 
Party’s legal system and seeking to ensure 
that labor laws and regulations provide for 
high quality and productive workplaces; and 
seek to foster transparency in the 
administration of labor law, promote 
compliance with, and effective enforcement 
of, existing labor law, and promote the 
general labor rights embodied in the 
Cambodian labor code.30   
 
To give force to the treaty’s language, inspectors from the 
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) periodically evaluated the working 
conditions inside textile manufacturing firms and published their reports for 
interested parties to see, especially American textile buyers and officials of 
the American government.31 If U.S. officials considered that Cambodian firms 
                                                                                                                    
 27 African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3741 (2004), 
available at http://www.agoa.gov/agoa_legislation/agoatext.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 
2005). 
 28 Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991, 19 U.S.C. § 3201 et. seq. (2004) 
(expired Dec. 4, 2001, renewed through Dec. 31, 2006) amended by Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002 in the Trade Act of 2002 §§ 3101-3108 
(Pub. Law No. 107-210) (2002)).   
 29 See generally Wayne Arnold, Translating Union Into Khmer, N.Y. TIMES, sec. 
C (July 12, 2001) (explaining the obstacles that unions have faced in the Cambodian 
textile industry).  
 30 USCBTA supra note 5, para. 10(A); see also Labor Code (1997) (Cambodia) 
[hereinafter Labor Code] (relying very heavily on the Ministry of Labor to provide 
inspectors to enforce the labor provisions), at 
http://www.moc.gov.kh/laws_regulation/rkm_labor_law_97.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 
2005). The Labor Code was similar to the USCBTA in that both approaches relied on 
inspectors to enforce the provisions. Id. art. 25.   
 31 See Sandra Polaski, Cambodia Blazes a New Path to Economic Growth and 
Job Creation, 7-8 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Trade, Equity, and 
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had substantially complied with Cambodian labor laws and internationally 
recognized core labor rights, the U.S. government would increase export 
quotas, allowing Cambodian firms increased access to U.S. markets.32 Unlike 
previous trade agreements, the USCBTA used neutral observers from an 
international organization to ensure that participating factories were in 
compliance with the Cambodian Labor Code as well as an incentive system to 
reward factories for complying with the law.33 
 
C.  THE LABOR SCENE BEFORE THE USCBTA 
 
As is the situation in many other countries, the greatest challenges to 
protecting labor rights in Cambodia appear in the form of state suppression of 
collective labor activity—government conduct with a long history beginning 
with the Khmer Rouge’s killing fields.34 Despite Cambodia’s history of 
                                                                                                                    
Development Project, 2004) (explaining the critical role of the ILO in the 
determination of increasing Cambodia’s export quota).  
 32 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 16-17 (advancing similar structures for future 
trade agreements as a mechanism for incentivizing compliance with labor laws).  
 33 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 16-17 (showing that the USCBTA's approach to 
labor enforcement was unique because of the use of the ILO's inspection regime and 
the use of the quota system as a reward for industry compliance with the Labor Code). 
 34 See David Chandler, Killing Fields, [hereinafter Killing Fields] (explaining that 
the world may never know exactly how many people died in Pol Pot’s killing fields), 
available at http://www.cybercambodia.com/dachs/killings/killings.html (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2005). The mystery surrounding Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge has made it 
impossible to know exactly how many people died during the revolution. Id. See also 
Kazmin, supra note 15, at 1 (contrasting Cambodia’s dark history with its rapid 
development and lucrative economic opportunities and discussing the cultural 
struggle that existed before, during, and after Pol Pot’s brutal regime, which provides 
the background for Cambodia’s unique economic successes in the face of dire 
national despair). The Khmer Rouge ruled until the Vietnamese took control of 
Phnom Penh in 1979, although the Khmer Rouge remained powerful until the early 
90s when the group split into two forces, and ultimately lost all power after Pol Pot’s 
death in 1998. Id. Pol Pot’s reign of terror began with his deceptive utopian plan to 
modernize the country and create perfect equality. Killing Fields, supra note 34. In 
1975, the Khmer Rouge captured Cambodia’s capital, bringing to the country’s war-
ravaged people a renewed hope for peace and prosperity. Id. See also Bruce Sharp, 
The Banyan Tree: Untangling Cambodian History, 2, (demonstrating the dichotomy 
between Cambodians' support of Pol Pot before his reign and the devastation that 
occurred after he usurped government authority), available at 
http://www.mekong.net/Cambodia/banyan2.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). An 
estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died, which was nearly thirty percent of the 
population. Id. See also Veron M.Y. Hung, Cambodia, in ASIA-PACIFIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL YEARBOOK 1996, at 69-70 (Cheryl Sanders & Graham Hassall eds., 
1998) (explaining that the Paris peace treaty called for the United Nations to assume 
administrative control over the government in 1992). The country’s first democratic 
free elections occurred the following year. Id. See also Elizabeth Becker, WHEN THE 
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conflict, the National Assembly passed the 1997 Labor Code, which offers 
thorough protections for labor rights.35 Although the Labor Code provides for 
these safeguards, there have been several roadblocks to effective enforcement, 
resulting in few protections for workers, especially in the garment industry.36 
The section that follows explains these challenges in greater detail.37 
 
D.  PROBLEMS THAT THE USCBTA’S DRAFTERS INTENDED THE 
AGREEMENT TO CONFRONT   
 
1.  Freedom of Association  
 
Cambodia’s labor force consists of approximately 5.4 million people, 
the majority of whom work in subsistence farming.38 Eight percent of the 
employees work in the industrial sector, with around 200,000 of these workers 
                                                                                                                    
WAR WAS OVER: CAMBODIA AND THE KHMER ROUGE REVOLUTION, 441-42 (1998) 
(stating that Hun Sen’s party, the Cambodian People’s Party (“CPP”), earned the 
second largest bloc in the National Assembly); see generally David P. Chandler, THE 
TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY: POLITICS, WAR, AND REVOLUTION SINCE 1945 
(1991) (surveying the history of conflict that ensued well into the 90s).  Not until 
1987 in Paris did peace talks begin between warring factions, including principally 
the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese-supported indigent government, the leader of 
which was the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen.  Id.  In 1989 Vietnamese officials 
announced that they would remove their forces from Cambodia, which preceded the 
signing of the 1991 peace treaty.  Id. In 1998, Hun Sen’s political party, the CPP, 
gained additional seats in the National Assembly, and an agreement between rival 
political factions and the CPP made Hun Sen the country’s sole Prime Minister. Id. In 
return, Prince Ranariddh, leader of the CPP’s political rival the Front Uni National 
pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacafique, et Copartif (“FUNCINPEC”), 
became President of the National Assembly. Id.   
 35 See Siphana Sok & Denora Sarin, THE CAMBODIA LEGAL RESOURCES 
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CAMBODIA 139 (1988) (the 1997 Labor 
Code “has clearly provided the necessary legislative reform more conducive to a free 
market economy”). 
 36 See John A. Hall, Human Rights and the Garment Industry in Contemporary 
Cambodia, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119, 146 (explaining the weaknesses in the Labor 
Code’s enforcement). The Code is only as strong as the will of labor inspectors to 
enforce it.  Id. The Ministry of Labor is rife with corruption, where low-paid 
inspectors receive bribes in the form of money and food to augment their government 
income in exchange for turning a blind eye to Code violations. Id.    
 37 See discussion infra Part II.D.1-3 (discussing the labor problems that the ILO 
had to deal with). 
 38 See INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS BUREAU, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: CAMBODIA 
(2003) [hereinafter Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau] (summarizing the state of Cambodia’s 
economy), at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/flt/cambodia-2003.htm (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
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employed in the textile industry.39 The relatively small number of Cambodia’s 
laborers in the textile trade work in an industry that accounts for roughly 
eighty percent of the country’s exports.40 In the late 90s there were nine 
registered federations/national labor unions that claimed to represent only 
around 160,000 of the 5.4 million workers.41 Eight of those 
federation/national labor unions operated in the textile trade.42 
 
 The principle challenge to freedom of association was truly free and 
independent labor union activity.43 Most of the unions were tethered either to 
political parties,44 which used the unions as a political device, or to managers 
                                                 
 39 See Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working to Improve 
Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Factories, 7 YALE HUM. RTS & DEV. L.J. 79, 82 
(2004) (describing the Cambodian garment industry’s demographics).    
 40 See Amy Kazmin, Nike Weighs Return to Cambodia: ILO Move to Monitor 
Factories May Prompt a Change of Heart by the US Sportswear Giant, FIN. TIMES, 
June, 18, 2002 (describing Nike’s return to the sizable Cambodian garment industry). 
 41 See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 3 (reporting that these 
numbers include “cumulative, overlapping, out-of-date or entirely fictional 
information”).  
 42 See id. (noting that despite the existence of these large labor federations and 
the protections offered to workers in the Cambodian constitution and the Labor Code, 
the Cambodian government seldom enforces these rights). 
 43 See, 3rd man charged in killing of Cambodian labor leader, ASIAN POLITICAL 
NEWS, Feb. 9, 2004 (discussing the conspiracy behind the death of Chea Vichea, a 
powerful labor leader who died as a result of an assassination). Government 
opposition leaders argue that the dominant political parties arranged for Vichea’s 
death because of his leadership in Cambodia’s most independent labor union, the 
FTUWKC. Id.  
 44 See Hall, supra note 36, at 146 (providing the history behind Cambodia’s labor 
unions and the struggle for freedom of association rights). Cambodia’s oldest union is 
the Independent Trade Union of Cambodian Workers (“ITUCW”), which descends 
from the Ministry of Unions that existed from 1979 until 1992. Id.  The Ministry of 
Unions was the sole labor organization in Cambodia at a time when all enterprises 
were state-owned. Id. The ITUCW claimed to represent 18,591 members throughout 
nineteen of the registered garment unions as of 1998. Id. Its leader is Men Samon, 
who is a Member of Parliament under Hun Sen’s CPP. Id. Through Men Samon, the 
CPP uses the ITUCW for political purposes and not necessarily for the good of the 
ITUCW’s members. Id. The largest of Cambodia’s labor unions is the Cambodian 
Unions Federation (“CUF”), which claims to represent 55,700 members of whom 
ninety percent works in the textile industry. Id. at 145. Chuon Mom Thol, who leads 
the CUF, also serves as the vice-chairman of Cambodia’s Labor Advisory Committee, 
which is a forum for employers, workers, and the government to address labor-related 
issues, and frequently represents Cambodia’s labor movement at international 
functions, including the ILO. Kolben, supra note 39, at 87. However, Chuon Mom 
Thol suffers criticism for leading nothing more than a “paper union,” designed to 
present a friendly face to the international community, but which in practice does very 
little for the employees it represents. Id. Philip Robertson of the AFL-CIO’s Bangkok 
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in the garment industry, who created “paper unions” to appear compliant with 
the Labor Code and to suppress otherwise legitimate union activity.45 At the 
end of the last decade, the Labor Code’s promises for meaningful rights to 
associate freely remained unfulfilled, as the government and private actors 
denied workers the ability to organize and to fight for their rights on their 
own.46   
 
2.  Collective Bargaining 
 
 The Labor Code offers little protection in the collective bargaining 
field.47 Originally, the law allowed factory workers to elect shop stewards to 
represent the workers to negotiate with management.48 The legitimacy of 
                                                                                                                    
office in explained in an interview with Hall that paper unions usually consist of 
representatives who the factory management has elected, not the workers. Hall, supra 
note 36, at 145. The factory management creates election ballots of “approved” 
candidates who function for management’s purposes after their election. Id. The Free 
Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (“FTUWKC”) is potentially 
the most independent of Cambodia’s unions. Id. With unions in sixteen garment 
factories representing 117 male and 2,213 female workers, the FTUWKC is 
Cambodia’s largest union. Id. Sam Rainsy, of the Sam Rainsy Party, founded the 
FTUWKC. Id. As with the other unions, the FTUWKC has received criticism that it 
functions for its leader as a source of political power. Id. Of course, the Sam Rainsy 
Party is not a part of the CPP-FINCINPEC coalition government and is far from 
approaching the power of either party. Hall, supra note 36, at 145. Some 
commentators have noted that the FTUWKC may be the start of an independent and 
credible labor movement in Cambodia. Id.          
 45 See Hall, supra note 36, at 149 (providing the history of the Free Union 
Federation of Cambodia (“FUFC”), which is a coalition of around one hundred 
unions in garment, cement, lumber, and brick factories). Ted Ngoy, who founded the 
union in 1993, is a Khmer-American who owns several factories that employs the 
FUFC’s members. Id. At the same time that Ngoy founded his union, he also founded 
the Development Republican Party. Id. The AFL-CIO has condemned the FUFC as an 
illegitimate union that serves as a vehicle for Ngoy’s political and financial ambitions. 
Id.    
 46 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
FOR 2000 (Feb. 23, 2001) (explaining that trade unions became more numerous active 
because the Government eased the process of union registration and improved labor 
law enforcement), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/681.htm 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Despite this growth in union activity, enforcement of the 
Labor Code remained a problem. Id. 
 47 See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (explaining that although 
the Labor Code provides for protections of these internationally recognized core 
worker rights, the inspectors rarely enforce them because of a lack of proper funding). 
See also Kolben, supra note 39, at 85 (documenting evidence of government 
corruption as an obstacle to effective labor law enforcement). 
 48 See Hall, supra note 36, at 139-40 (explaining the election of shop stewards 
and the fraudulent circumstances surrounding the elections). 
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these elections was questionable as manufacturers strictly controlled the 
process for nominating candidates.49 Whatever the validity of the elections, 
factory management negotiated with the stewards instead of the unions 
because the law provided these stewards with negotiation rights superior to 
those of labor unions.50 However, a recent regulation changed the way that 
system functioned.51 The regulations established a voting process for 
determining who has the right to represent the factory workers, which solved 
the steward problem.52 Despite the new regulations, collective bargaining has 
been relatively nonexistent.53  
 
3.  Employment Discrimination 
 
 The predominance of women and girls in the workforce has 
facilitated the possibility for employment discrimination along gender lines.54 
Although women constitute fifty-two percent of the overall population and 
seventy percent of the industrial workforce, the overwhelming majority of 
managers in the garment industry are men.55 In fact, in Phnom Penh, 
approximately 200 textile factories are in operation, employing around 
200,000 workers.56 Over eighty-five percent of these employees are women.57  
                                                 
 49 See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (describing the process by 
which management influenced steward elections). 
 50 See id. (demonstrating the way the Labor Code allowed factory management to 
circumvent the role of labor unions by using stewards). 
 51 See id. (discussing the new regulation providing for a process to determine who 
has the right to negotiate with management).   
 52 See id. (observing that despite the new regulation, collective bargaining rights 
remain elusive).  
 53 See Kolben, supra note 39, at 84 (elaborating on the difficulties surrounding 
enforcement of the Labor Code due to government corruption). 
 54 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
FOR 2002, sec. 4 (Mar. 31, 2003) (describing the conditions in Cambodian industry 
that give rise to gender imbalances in the work place), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18238.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
 55 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
FOR 2003 (Feb. 25, 2004) (explaining that women comprise 52 percent of the 
population, 60 percent of agricultural workers, 85 percent of the business work force, 
70 percent of the industrial work force, and 60 percent of all service sector workers), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27766.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 
2005). Women often are concentrated in low-paying jobs in these sectors and largely 
were excluded from management positions. Id. 
 56 See Kolben, supra note 44, at 82 (describing the employment situation 
Cambodia's garment industry). 
 57 See id. (using factory demographic figures to suggest that the labor rights 
agenda is more complex than the employer-employee relationship; gender, race, and 
age also play critical roles in deciphering the poor conditions in Cambodia’s textile 
industry).  
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Although Cambodian law provides women with significant legal protection, 
the reality is that many of those protections exist only on paper.58 The 1998 
U.N. Report of the Secretary General on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Cambodia concluded that “the situation of women in Cambodia, in particular 
in relation to their . . . conditions of work and violence against them, 
continues to be of deep concern and needs to be addressed as a matter of high 
priority.”59 The same report noted that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
received less than one percent of the national budget in 1998.60 According to 
the Cambodian Labor Organization, managers and security guards are 
responsible for many abuses of worker rights, such as verbal and physical 
abuse, intimidation, and coerced overtime—all of which result from the 
managers’ perception of the proper way to treat female employees.61  
 
III.  ANALYSIS: ENFORCING THE LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE 
USCBTA 
 
Although the USCBTA incorporated the Cambodian Labor Code to 
achieve its goals “to improve . . . working conditions,”62 the ILO’s 
interpretation of the agreement failed to implement the parties’ objectives.63 
While the ILO’s program included some initially promising features, critical 
failures occurred in the inspection regime’s: 
• organizational structure,  
• factory recruitment process,  
                                                 
 58 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in 
Cambodia, Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary General, 
U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., ¶¶ 108-17, U.N. Doc. A/53/400 (1998) [hereinafter SG 
Report: Cambodia] (describing the laws designed to protect Cambodian women in 
contrast to the significant problems women face with regard to employment, health 
care, education, and equitable treatment from law enforcement), available at 
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/genassembly/a-53-400.htm (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005). Cambodian law grants women significant protection from 
employment discrimination.  Id. ¶ 108; see also Hall, supra note 36, at 158 (asserting 
that the Constitution provides for equal rights for women, including equal pay for 
equal work).   
 59 SG Report: Cambodia, supra note 58, at 108.   
 60 See id. at 110 (suggesting that discrimination against women continues to 
persist because of a lack of political will to change it).     
 61 See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 46, at sec. 6(a) (explaining that the 
Cambodian constitution contains explicit language providing for equal rights for 
women, equal pay for equal work, and equal status in marriage, but cultural traditions 
continue to limit the ability of women to reach senior positions in business and other 
areas). 
 62 USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A). 
 63 See discussion infra Part III (showing that while the agreement called for the 
promotion of the Labor Code, the ILO program never achieved that goal because of 
the ILO's weak enforcement role). 
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• monitoring and reporting methods,  
• the incentive structure, and  
• the interpretation of the Labor Code’s provisions regarding freedom 
of association, labor disputes, employment discrimination, and child 
labor.64  
As a result, working conditions in the garment industry remained 
unimproved, in stark contrast to the intentions of the USCBTA’s drafters.65 
 
A.  THE ILO ESTABLISHED A PROGRAM THAT WAS TOO WEAK TO 
IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN 
THE GARMENT INDUSTRY 
 
1.  The Project Structure That the ILO Implemented to Enforce the USCBTA 
Successfully Encouraged Broad Participation   
 
To implement the Labor Code as the USCBTA required, the ILO 
effectively established an organizational structure equitable to all parties 
involved, without which the monitoring project never would have developed 
and the treaty’s goals never could have materialized.66 Although the 
agreement’s language was indeterminate with regard to the organizational 
structure and silent on the identity of the parties that the ILO needed to 
involve, the circumstances of the business environment in the garment 
industry required the ILO to bring together parties from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training, and Youth Rehabilitation 
(“MOSALVY”), the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia, and 
the Cambodian trade union movement to discuss the manner in which the ILO 
                                                 
 64 See discussion infra Part III (focusing on these critical failures because these 
are internationally recognized core labor standards). 
 65 But see PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 5 (proclaiming the 
success of the USCBTA). 
 66 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (agreeing that the benefits of trade 
should include improved working conditions and living standards for workers in the 
Cambodian garment industry, while remaining silent on how the ILO should 
implement the Labor Code to achieve those goals). This silence allowed the ILO to 
adopt its own organizational structure, removing from the U.S and Cambodian 
governments the onus of determining this element in the agreement itself. Id. 
Compare Capitalism in the Raw: Labour Rights and Free Trade with the United 
States, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2004 [hereinafter Capitalism in the Raw] (suggesting that 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) may never pass through the 
U.S. Congress if the agreement fails to include essential enforcement provisions, 
which are generally highly contentious when states negotiate trade agreements 
because enforcement encroaches on sovereignty), available at 2004 WLNR 15258863 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2005), with Russo, supra note 19, at 112-19 (questioning 
whether NAFTA’s labor side agreement managed to provide an effective dispute 
resolution structure despite bargaining and compromise).   
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would structure its implementation program.67 Including these parties in 
developing the program was crucial because it allowed all parties with a stake 
in the USCBTA to voice their concerns about the way the ILO enforced the 
agreement.68 With such involvement, more parties were likely to participate in 
the program, allowing an increased number of workers to reap the benefits of 
the ILO inspections, which in turn was supposed to lead to improved working 
conditions and living standards.69 However, despite the ILO’s novel 
organizational structure, those benefits never materialized because of critical 
failures in other areas.70     
 
2.  The Registration Process That the ILO Adopted Failed to Foster Adequate 
Transparency  
 
 The USCBTA failed to define how the trade regime would “foster 
transparency in the administration of labor law,”71 which allowed the ILO to 
                                                 
 67 See Cambodian Govt Expands Partnership With Private Sector, XINHUA 
GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 5, 2000 (illustrating the confluence of interests of the 
government, the garment industry, and labor interests that the ILO needed to address 
because of the great economic value that the industry represented for Cambodia and 
its people). 
 68 See, e.g., INT’L LABOUR ORG., THIRD SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING 
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR: STATEMENT OF THE 
PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RELEASE OF THE THIRD ILO SYNTHESIS 
REPORT ON THE WORKING CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S TEXTILE AND 
APPAREL SECTOR (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter Third Synthesis Report] (stating the 
opinions of representatives from the government of Cambodia, the Garment 
Manufacturers Association in Cambodia, and the Cambodian trade union movement 
regarding the ILO’s third synthesis report on the working conditions situation in the 
garments industry), at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia3.htm (last visted 
Feb. 4, 2005).     
 69 See INT’L LABOUR ORG., SEVENTH SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING 
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR: STATEMENT OF THE 
PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RELEASE OF THE SEVENTH ILO SYNTHESIS 
REPORT ON THE WORKING CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S TEXTILE AND 
APPAREL SECTOR (Sept. 19, 2003) (expressing appreciation that the ILO ensured that 
all parties involved had fulfilled their duties, which in turn led to improved respect for 
worker rights), at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia7.htm (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2005).  
 70 But see ILO report reveals improved Cambodian work conditions, WOMEN’S 
WEAR DAILY, April 20, 2004 (presenting reports that ILO inspections led to improved 
working conditions in textile and apparel factories), available at 2004 WLNR 
12873960 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). 
 71 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (discussing in general terms that 
the U.S. and Cambodian governments should promote and rely on transparency, while 
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adopt the least stringent registration program.72 The registration process was 
essential to transparency because without it any factory could have traded 
with the United States, even a factory that refused to allow the ILO to 
undertake inspections.73 With this system, at least U.S. businesses knew that 
their trading partners in the Cambodian garment industries, at a bare 
minimum, participated in ILO labor inspections.74 More than that, however, 
the registration process that the ILO adopted involved a contract, the MOU 
that the ILO signed with the factories,75 that used a full access clause, which 
was essential to achieving transparency.76 Because the MOU required that 
factory management give to the ILO monitors full access to the factory, 
                                                                                                                    
not including language defining what constitutes sufficient transparency or how the 
parties intended to achieve that goal).  
 72 But see Amy Kazmin, Garment Factories Are Being Forced to Mend Their 
Ways, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at 3 (praising the model of transparency as 
“unrivalled”), available at 2002 WLNR 6785214 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). The 
article also mentioned that factory owners “frantically” telephoned ILO inspectors to 
ensure a clean report before the inspectors named their factories individually. Id. 
 73 See INT’L LABOUR ORG., FIRST SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING 
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR, sec. 1.3.1 (Nov. 22, 
2001) [hereinafter First Synthesis Report] (explaining that the Ministry of Commerce 
corrected this problem by promulgating a regulation that permitted only registered 
factories to use allocated export quotas to trade with U.S. markets or to buy export 
quotas through the official quota bidding process), at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia.htm (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2005).  
 74 See Amy Kazmin, Garment Buyers Prefer Cambodia, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2004, at 9 (reporting that while buyers know that Cambodia’s labor standards outrank 
those of other major Asian textile exporters, such as Vietnam, China, Thailand, and 
Bangladesh, Cambodia ranks worst in terms of “red tape” and customs delays), 
available at 2004 WLNR 13022063 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). 
 75 See First Synthesis Report, supra 73, sec. 1.3.1 (explaining the details of the 
contract between the ILO and the participating parties).  
 76 Compare Anthony DePalma, Nafta's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals 
Settle Disputes, but Go too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, sec. 3 
(reporting criticism that NAFTA tribunals, which investors can use to sue 
governments for violations of NAFTA Chapter Eleven provisions, are too secretive, 
even though they are effective at protecting investor rights), available at 2001 WLNR 
3421720 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). Unlike the ILO program, which uses a regulatory 
approach, the NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunals use an adversarial model, which 
provides transparency to the fact-finder through pleadings, arguments, and evidence. 
Id., with PUBLIC CITIZEN, ANOTHER AMERICAS IS POSSIBLE: THE IMPACT OF NAFTA 
ON THE U.S. LATINO COMMUNITY AND LESSONS FOR FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS, 
14 (asserting that similar NAFTA provisions are too weak to protect labor rights), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/LatinosReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 
2005). Even though workers can bring complaints like those that the investors can 
bring under Chapter Eleven, the transparency is ineffective because the labor 
provisions are too dilute. Id.    
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including free interaction with shop stewards, union representatives, and 
factory workers, the inspectors were able to go beyond their checklist by 
using interviews to determine the full extent of their working conditions.77 
Yet, despite this full access guarantee, the inspection regimen did not require 
interviews with workers, it only granted permission for interviews.78 Although 
workers were free to interview with the ILO inspectors, the ILO was 
powerless to protect workers from intimidation or job loss for reporting 
truthfully or for “whistle-blowing.”79 Furthermore, even though the MOU 
guaranteed full access in the name of transparency, recipients of the ILO’s 
reports knew little more about the factories than their names and what kinds 
of suggestions that the inspectors rendered.80 
 
3.  The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms Were too Weak to Fulfill the 
USCBTA’s Mission 
 
Although the parties to the USCBTA sought to “improve . . . working 
conditions” and foster “transparency in the administration of labor law,”81 the 
                                                 
 77 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.1 (explaining further that 
while the ILO was interested in obtaining full access to factory employees, the 
factories were concerned with inaccuracies that this system could have generated). In 
exchange, the ILO agreed that monitoring visits would occur in a fair and objective 
manner, that inspections would take place in such a manner as to cause the least 
disruptions, that basic information would be kept confidential, and that the ILO would 
have considered any allegation of inspection-related misconduct in good faith. Id. 
 78 See Kolben, supra note 39, at 91 n. 72 (explaining that the United States 
rejected earlier proposals for the program that would have granted the ILO greater 
power because of concerns for Cambodia’s state sovereignty). Mark Barenberg, 
professor of law at Columbia University Law School and an expert on international 
labor regulation, designed a stronger proposal that would have granted the ILO a 
greater enforcement role. Id. The American Union of Needle Trades and Industrial 
and Textile Employees (“UNITE”) in turn lobbied for the agreement to adopt this 
plan. Id.  
 79 But see Sheridan Prasso, Case Study: Bringing Labor Issues Into the 
Cambodian Textile Agreement, INITIATIVE FOR POL’Y DIALOGUE, 2003 (asserting that 
the mere presence of the ILO gave to Cambodian workers too much power to defend 
their own rights), at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/j_cambodia.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2005).  
 80 See, e.g., id. (lauding the ILO program’s impressive strengths such as 
improvements in correct payment of wages, improvements in mandatory overtime, 
and improvements with regard to freedom of association protections). Although 
Prasso cites to the ILO’s Sixth Synthesis Report, she provides no guidance as to what 
constituted a noteworthy improvement or how those improvements related to the 
original working conditions. Id. Nor does Prasso articulate whether those 
improvements correlated to improved working conditions. Id. Because these reports 
contain little information, no one can. Id.    
 81 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (linking improved working conditions 
in part to transparency into the enforcement of the Labor Code). 
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agreement failed in two respects to include sufficient guidance as to how the 
ILO was to achieve these goals.82 First, unlike the process that similar treaties 
adopted, the USCBTA lacked a frequency clause with regard to the 
numerosity of inspections.83 In particular, this agreement failed to specify how 
frequently the ILO inspectors should visit the factories.84 More frequent 
inspections would have allowed the ILO to report a more complete picture of 
the working conditions inside the participating factories.85 The inspection 
schedule that the ILO adopted required only two visits to a participating 
factory during a six-month time period.86 Although the first visit included a 
full-blown inspection regimen involving the 156 question checklist, the 
follow-up visit was limited to those aspects of the checklist that elicited a 
suggestion from the ILO inspectors during the first inspection.87 The 
infrequent inspections meant that the parties to the USCBTA had no certainty 
that the laborers in these factories received the benefits of the Labor Code’s 
protections on the other days of the year when the ILO inspectors were 
absent.88 Yet, those who relied on the reports from these inspections, such as 
U.S. businesses and U.S. trade officials, used the ILO reports to make trade 
                                                 
 82 But see PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 5 (heralding the ILO 
project as exemplary for using trade to increase respect for workers’ rights). 
 83 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 23, Annex 18.5 (providing an entire section 
for the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement’s Labor Cooperation Mechanism).  
 84 Compare Id. para. 5(a)-(g) (elucidating seven distinct, but illustrative, methods 
of achieving the goals of the U.S. and Chilean governments ), with USCBTA, supra 
note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (lacking similar specificity, particularly with regard to 
frequency of inspections).   
 85 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BAD DREAMS: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 
OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA, 6-8 (July, 2004) (asserting that Human 
Rights Watch’s reports of Saudi Arabian working conditions would have been more 
complete if the inspectors could have conducted interviews of all the available 
workers), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/saudi0704/saudi0704.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains closed to human rights 
inspectors. Id. The report acknowledged that without sufficient access to work sites, 
the conclusions drawn from the reports were an incomplete picture of the full labor 
scene. Id. 
 86 See Third Synthesis Report, supra note 68, sec. 2 (emphasizing that reported 
information for the named factories only represents changes in the situation from the 
first visit to the follow-up visit). 
 87 See id. sec. 1.3.2 (stating that the ILO mainly derived the checklist from 
provisions located in the Labor Code). 
 88 But see U.S. EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH, US-CAMBODIAN ECONOMIC AND 
TRADE RELATIONS (proclaiming that the USCBTA was an “unqualified success” in 
promoting Cambodian economic growth while promoting Cambodia as a labor-
friendly country) at http://usembassy.state.gov/cambodia/wwwf0040.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2005).  
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policy and business decisions worth millions of dollars.89 Instead of effective 
transparency and improved working conditions, the result of these inspections 
was an illusion of compliance, which fell far short of the USCBTA’s goals, 
but which was all that the agreement’s lax language required.90 
 
 Second, the agreement was silent on the specific elements that the 
reports needed to include.91 This allowed the ILO to create a reporting system 
that allowed the Labor Code to go unenforced.92 This system lacked any 
indicia of whether a factory was a major violator or a minor violator.93 
Without such a differentiation, the recipients of the reports were unaware of 
the full picture of the labor landscape.94 Furthermore, specific details, such as 
the circumstances in the named factories that gave rise to the suggestion or the 
severity of the Labor Code violation, would have more effectively created 
transparency in the garment industry.95 With the deficient language in the 
trade agreement, the ILO was free to create an ineffective reporting system.96   
 
4.  The Quota Incentive System is Ineffective Because It Creates a Free-rider 
Problem 
 
 Although the USCBTA provided that the United States would 
increase Cambodia’s export quota by up to fourteen percent “if the United 
                                                 
 89 See id. (reporting that in 2003 Cambodian exports to the United States 
amounted to over $1.2 billion). Eighty-five percent of that amount came from the 
textile trade. Id.  
 90 See USCBTA, supra note 5 (adopting a hollow goal-oriented approach by 
specifying goals to which the parties aspired while ignoring the steps by which the 
parties would achieve those goals).   
 91 Compare id. (agreeing to promote "general labor rights" that were "embodied" 
in the Labor Code), with First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 2 (elaborating all 
of the elements that the ILO chose to incorporate), and Labor Code, supra note 30, 
chs. III-XIV (enumerating with great specificity particular protections that workers 
should receive). 
 92 See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (stating that the United 
States was willing to trade with any company in the Cambodian garment industry as 
long as the industry as a whole substantially complied with the Labor Code). 
 93 See, e.g., Third Synthesis Report, supra note 68, sec. 2 (noting simply whether 
the named factories complied in full, in part, or not all). 
 94 But see Prasso, supra note 79 (championing the success of the USCBTA in the 
field of labor rights protection). 
 95 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI (providing a sliding scale of penalties 
depending on the kind of labor provision that a factory owner violated). 
 96 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.4 (explaining that the first 
report only included sixteen percent of the factories participating in the program and 
that the monitoring of the factories was not an objective in itself, but rather part of a 
larger process to improve the industry as a whole). The report is silent on what the 
other parts of the larger process consist of. Id.  
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States Government determine[d] that . . . the Royal Government of Cambodia 
ha[d] taken . . . major action resulting in a significant change in working 
conditions,”97 the incentive structure failed to achieve the treaty’s goals 
because the trade agreement allowed grossly non-compliant firms to trade 
with U.S. markets.98 This result occurred because the USCBTA granted to the 
garment industry a higher export quota if the industry as a whole 
“substantially complie[d]” with Cambodian labor law.99 Even those factories 
that failed to follow any of the ILO inspectors’ recommendations were able to 
trade with the United States at the higher export rate because the industry as a 
whole complied substantially with the inspectors’ suggestions.100 For instance, 
every year that the treaty was in force, the United States increased the export 
quotas, which offered the entire industry enhanced access to U.S. markets.101 
However, the synthesis reports show that several factories refused to institute 
most of the inspectors’ recommendations.102 Even though these factories 
declined to change their business practices, they enjoyed the increased trade 
benefits with the United States because the other factories followed the 
inspectors’ suggestions.103 For those workers in the “free-riding” factories, 
                                                 
 97 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(D) (conditioning these statements based 
on consultations between the U.S. and Cambodian governments).  
 98 But see Polaski, supra note 31, at 14 (remarking that an impressive number of 
factories made rapid changes and corrections to practices that routinely confronted 
apparel workers in many countries). The author bases her claims on the flawed ILO 
reports. Id. 
 99 See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (stating the conditions 
for which the United States would increase the quota). 
 100 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 7 (stating that nonparticipating firms could have 
shared in the increased trading without the related costs of more stringent labor 
policies). 
 101 See, e.g., Cambodia: U.S. increases garment quota, ASIAN LABOUR NEWS 
Dec. 5, 2003 (reporting the quota increases, which yielded over $1 billion in revenue 
for Cambodian industry), available at 
http://www.asianlabour.org/archives/000183.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
 102 See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures (unpublished document, on file 
with author) (showing that despite the presence of the labor inspectors and the 
positive incentives from the USCBTA, several factories failed to implement the 
inspectors' recommendations). This document, compiled from all nine ILO synthesis 
reports, lists all of the suggestions that the inspectors made in the areas of freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, employment discrimination, and child labor. Id. 
This document lists all of the suggestions that the inspectors made with regard to 
these issues, how many factories followed these inspections, and the percentage rate 
of compliance. Id. It also lists the total number of factories that received suggestions 
from each reporting period and from the aggregate of all nine reports. Id. 
 103 See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (explaining that 
industry-wide substantial compliance was sufficient for individual factories to 
participate in the increased quotas). 
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working conditions may never improve.104 Factories that severely violated the 
Labor Code were free to participate in the quota bidding process along-side 
firms that adhered to all pertinent labor regulations.105 While the agreement’s 
goals were aspirational, its methods embraced mediocrity.106 
 
B.  THE USCBTA’S INCORPORATION OF CAMBODIAN LABOR LAW 
AND THE ILO’S SUBSEQUENT ENFORCEMENT OF THAT LAW 
FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE TREATY’S OBJECTIVES 
 
1.  Freedom of Association 
 
 The ILO’s method of incorporating the Labor Code’s freedom of 
association provisions was insufficient “to improve . . . working conditions” 
consistent with the USCBTA’s mission.107 The agreement failed to empower 
the ILO with an adequate means of enforcing the Labor Code’s freedom of 
association provisions, which guarantee, in part, that “workers . . . have the 
right, without prior authorization, to form professional organizations of their 
own choosing.”108 Even though the inspectors conducted over 209 
                                                 
 104 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing the free-rider problem in 
economics terms, but ignoring the fact that that working conditions will not improve 
for a large segment of the work force). 
 105 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.1 (reporting that even 
though the Ministry of Commerce required that all factories interested in trading with 
the United States needed to register with the ILO program, there was no requirement 
that any of the factories adopt the ILO's suggestions at all).  
 106 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (providing in five brief 
paragraphs a list of goals and describing the incentive structure, but listing no 
methods for achieving those goals), with U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 23, ch. 18 
(devoting eight pages and an entire chapter to labor provisions). 
 107 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (connecting the goal of improved 
working conditions with the Labor Code's freedom of association articles). 
 108 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XI, art. 266 (articulating the extensive 
freedom of association provisions in twelve articles, but which call upon the Ministry 
of Labor to undertake a significant enforcement role, which the ILO lacked under the 
USCBTA); see, e.g., Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 
(demonstrating the insufficiency of the ILO's inspections in this regard). Thirty-three 
factories received suggestions that they “ensure that workers have the right to freely 
form and join trade unions and freely participate in union activities.” Id. Upon the 
follow-up visit, the monitors found that seventy-six percent of the factories had 
complied with the recommendation. Id. The monitors suggested to fourteen factories 
that “management refrain from taking measures that would prevent workers from 
freely forming or joining unions and engaging in union activities.” Id. Of these, 
seventy-nine percent had complied. Id. The monitors recommended to ten factories 
that “management should ensure that union leaders are dismissed only in accordance 
with the requirements of the law.” Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra 
note 102. Ninety percent of the factories complied. Id. Twenty-two factories received 
suggestions that management ensure that “no worker suffers disadvantages because of 
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inspections, which resulted in a relatively high-level of compliance with the 
articles on freedom of association, workers in the garment industry still 
suffered from low unionization and high incidents of suppressed union-related 
activity.109 This may have resulted because nowhere in the trade agreement’s 
text is there an authorization, implicit or explicit, for the ILO to intervene in 
union-management disputes or for the ILO to protect workers who sought to 
organize pursuant to the Labor Code.110 
 
Instead of assuming an enforcement role for the Labor Code’s 
freedom of association provisions, the ILO’s only method of incorporating the 
Labor Code was the use of the 156-question checklist.111 The questions that 
the inspector’s asked and the suggestions that they made were little more than 
an affirmation of the industry’s respect for existing labor legislation.112 For 
instance, one of the suggestions that the inspectors rendered was as follows, 
“management [should] refrain from taking measures that would prevent 
workers from freely forming or joining unions and engaging in union 
activities.”113 But, while the Labor Code expressly called for the Ministry of 
Labor to enforce this provision, the ILO merely reported whether 
                                                                                                                    
union membership or participation in union activities.” Id. Seventy-three percent of 
the factories complied. Id. The inspectors suggested that thirty-two factories hold new 
shop steward elections. Id. Seventy-five percent of the factories complied. Id. Ninety-
three factories received suggestions to ensure that “the next shop steward elections are 
held in accordance with the relevant rules and procedures.” Cumulative ILO 
Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. Only twenty-eight percent of these 
factories complied. Id. One-hundred seventy-eight factories received suggestions to 
ensure that shop stewards are provided two office hours per week, an office, and 
working materials to undertake their duties. Id. Only twenty-one percent of these 
factories complied. Id.   
 109 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 55, sec. 6(a) (explaining the reports of anti-
union harassment by employers, including the dismissal of union leaders, in more 
than 20 garment factories and other enterprises during the year). 
110 See Labor Code, supra note 30, at ch. XII, art. 301 (granting authority to the 
Ministry of Labor's inspectors to intervene in labor disputes). The USCBTA fails to 
empower the ILO with similar authority. Id.  
111 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.2 (describing all of the 
monitoring procedures that the ILO used, including the checklist).  
112 See, e.g., Seventh Synthesis Report, supra note 69, sec. 2 (illustrating that the 
contents of the checklist consisted of questions that only reflected the contents of the 
Labor Code). The checklist method failed to accompany the enforcement power that 
the Labor Code contained. Id. 
 113 See INT’L LABOUR ORG., EIGHTH SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING 
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR, sec. 2.1.3.1 (Feb., 2004) 
[hereinafter Eight Synthesis Report] (reporting that the inspectors gave this 
suggestion only to eleven factories, of whom seven complied in full), at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia8.htm (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2005). 
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management violated this element of the code.114 There is no guidance as to 
what would have constituted a “measure” to “prevent” workers from “freely” 
forming unions.115 The ILO needed to define these terms so that the readers of 
the reports could know how closely the factories adhered to the freedom of 
association articles.116 For instances, there are criticisms that Cambodian 
unions are linked closely with factory owners or political parties.117 We 
simply do not know whether these constitute “freely” formed unions under the 
ILO checklist system.118 Nor do we know if these unions were acceptable to 
the ILO as long as management had refrained from taking the forbidden 
“measures.”119 This is the result of the checklist approach.120 While a stronger 
enforcement role might have provided more certainty and therefore more 
                                                 
 114 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI, art. 359 (granting to the Ministry of 
Labor's inspectors the power to enforce penalties).  
 115 See id. ch. XVII, arts. 387-89 (creating labor courts that would have the 
authority to determine the precise meanings of these words so as to give guidance as 
to how the violators of this provision actually treated its workers). 
 116 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN’S WORK: DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UKRAINIAN LABOR FORCE, 18-26 (Aug., 2003) (providing 
an example of a reporting method that other investigators have used that give enough 
details to create a complete image of employment discrimination in the Ukraine), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ukraine0803/ukraine0803full.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
 117 See UNITED NATIONS, SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA, para. 107 
(Sept. 18, 1998) (reporting that management often assumed control over unions and 
that the government did little to prevent worker intimidation), available at 
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/genassembly/a-53-400.htm (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005).    
 118 But see Eighth Synthesis Report, supra note 113, sec. 4 (indicating that the 
ILO's successes in the area of freedom of association compensates for problems that 
continue to persist in other fields, despite the lack of guidance as to what constitutes 
truly free union formation). 
 119 But see AFL-CIO & UNITE, CENTRAL AMERICA: LABOR RIGHTS AND CHILD 
LABOR REPORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRADE ACT OF 2002, SECTION 2102(C)(8)-(9), 
19 (June 5, 2003) (arguing that CAFTA should replicate the Cambodian example 
because of the ILO's success, despite the clarity in the checklist's language), available 
at http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/upload/CAFTA.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
 120 Compare Seventh Synthesis Report, supra note 69, sec. 1.3.2 (suggesting that 
the regulatory approach works best when the inspectors are in a position to see Labor 
Code violations, which is problematic because some of the most egregious violations 
could go unhidden, especially if factory management is particularly coercive), with 
NAALC, supra note 18, arts. 4, 5 (creating a private action for workers and granting 
them access to a full tribunal with due process of law). The NAALC's adversarial 
approach allows workers to bring to light through pleadings labor law violations that 
a purely regulatory approach otherwise might miss. Id.   
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transparency, a timid regime of this variety was all that the agreement 
required.121 
 
2.  Labor Disputes, Conciliation, and Arbitration 
 
 The ILO interpreted its role in this area far too narrowly “to improve . 
. . working conditions” in the garment industry.122 The Labor Code provides 
for remedies of labor disputes in factories that have formal conciliation 
agreements as well as those factories where management and workers have 
not yet reached such an accord.123 The presence of these latter provisions was 
essential because the ILO’s monitory role in this area did little to encourage 
registration of collective bargaining agreements.124 For instance, even though 
there were over 200 factories in the program, MOSALVY only had registered 
approximately twenty collective bargaining agreements.125 The inspections 
failed to encourage workers and management to work together to create such 
                                                 
 121 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (leaving an open-ended 
labor law enforcement mechanism, which permitted the ILO to adopt the least 
stringent means of enforcement), with NAALC, supra note 18, (devoting over fifty 
articles, including specific definitions and an entire dispute settlement procedure, as 
well as several annexes to developing a stronger enforcement structure). However, 
while the NAALC offered workers direct access to the dispute settlement process, the 
enforcement structure failed to provide adequate remedies. Id. art. 22.  
 122 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (lacking sufficiently specific 
information to guarantee that the ILO would adopt the most effective standards to 
achieve the agreement's otherwise lofty goals). 
 123 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XII, art. 309(a)-(c) (defining the three 
separate ways that the Ministry of Labor may intervene to resolve disputes between 
management and labor, including a provision that creates a dispute resolution 
structure even without a previously written conciliation agreement). 
 124 But see Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 
(demonstrating that the ILO inspectors found that high numbers of factories violated 
this right and only small percentages of the participating factories actually followed 
the ILO's suggestions). One-hundred twenty-seven factories received a suggestion to 
ensure that workers understood the terms of their employment contract. Id. Only 
thirty percent of the factories complied. Id. Sixty-six factories received a suggestion 
to amend employment contracts to comply with the law. Id. Only thirty-three percent 
of the factories complied. Id. Twenty-two factories received a suggestion to ensure 
that dispute settlement procedures comply with the law. Id. Thirty-six percent of the 
factories complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. 
Twenty-eight factories received a suggestion to that management should implement 
conciliation agreements. Id. Fifty-four percent of the factories complied. Id. Twenty 
factories received a suggestion that management should ensure that conciliation 
agreements are posted in the workplace. Id. Eighty-five percent of the factories 
complied. Id.   
 125 Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (noting that the low number of 
collective bargaining agreements is indicative of failed government policy). 
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an agreement and register it with the Ministry of Labor, which could have 
enforced the agreement when either party violated the conditions.126   
 
 In the absence of these agreements, the Labor Code provided that 
workers still could have received arbitration for labor-related disputes with 
management.127 Although the USCBTA used the ILO to circumvent the 
internal corruption of the Ministry of Labor by using neutral inspectors, the 
ILO lacked the authority to implement the functions of dispute resolution and 
mediation as the Labor Code provides.128 Under the USCBTA, the ILO’s role 
was purely monitory, but that was not enough.129         
 
3.  Child Labor 
 
The monitoring and reporting system that the USCBTA adopted 
failed to achieve its stated objectives because it was possible that the relevant 
provisions of the labor code went unenforced and the number of child workers 
went drastically underreported.130 Although the Labor Code called for the 
                                                 
 126 See Labor Code, supra note 30, art. 309(a) (noting that the parties could 
resolve their dispute through any procedure that they devised in the mutual 
agreement). 
 127 See id. art. 303 (allowing the Ministry of Labor's inspector to intervene in 
labor disputes not only when one of the parties notifies the inspector, but even if the 
inspector becomes aware of the dispute through other means).  
 128 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E)(calling for the promotion 
of compliance with the Labor Code, but failing to specify whether the ILO should 
usurp the Ministry of Labor's authority as the Labor Code provides), with Labor 
Code, arts. 302-08 (granting significant authority to the Ministry of Labor to intervene 
in labor disputes, including the power to bind parties to a collective agreement when 
the party representing the workers is a trade union). 
 129 See, e.g., Labor Code, arts. 302-08 (granting the Ministry of Labor a monitory 
role, but also providing authority to resolve conflicts). This illustrates that the 
National Assembly envisioned that while the Ministry of Labor would conduct its role 
through inspections, it also should have significant enforcement authority over those 
areas of the Labor Code that factories or workers abrogated. Id.   
 130 See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (reporting that 
the ILO documented only fourteen instances of child labor throughout the four years 
of inspections and the two hundred factories that they visited); see also MINISTRY OF 
PLANNING, CAMBODIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000: CHILDREN AND 
EMPLOYMENT, 33-35 (2000) (indicating that the ILO reports may be troublingly 
erroneous), at 
http://hdrc.undp.org.in/APRI/NHDR_Rgn/Cambodia/cmbda_nhdr_2000.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005). Approximately forty-two percent of children aged ten to 
thirteen were "economically active" during the time period under review. Id. at 31. Of 
the children who held jobs, approximately seven to eleven percent worked in the 
manufacturing sector, which the report defined as jobs in the garment and apparel 
manufacturing, brick-making, and salt production. Id. On average, these children 
worked around forty-four hours per week for around thirty-five weeks per year. Id. at 
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Ministry of Labor, and in some cases the Labor Advisory Committee, to 
regulate the working environment for workers between eighteen and fifteen 
years old131 the ILO had no such power.132 In fact, the USCBTA did not even 
require or suggest that the ILO work together with the Ministry of Labor and 
the Labor Advisory Committee in the area of child labor.133 That kind of 
cooperation would have been the least possible means to ensure that children 
received the Labor Code’s protection.134 The result was that the ILO, which 
had limited power to discover child labor in the first place, had no power to 
prevent or correct child labor violations once the inspectors found them.135 
 
4.  Employment Discrimination   
 
For the women working in the garment factories, there was very little 
hope for improved working conditions or professional advancement despite 
the presence of the ILO and the financial incentives that the United States 
government had installed.136 The regulatory model that the ILO adopted failed 
in this regard because there was a low compliance rate for the many instances 
                                                                                                                    
32. The report emphasized that because of its methodology, the reported numbers 
"may grossly understate the number of child workers in the country." Id. at 29. 
 131 See Labor Code, supra note 30, art. 177 (mandating that the minimum age for 
employment is fifteen years old). 
 132 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (lacking any discussion of 
child labor), with Labor Code, supra note 30, arts. 177-181 (banning child labor and 
regulating the means by which children between fifteen and eighteen may seek 
employment), and Canada-Chile FTA, supra note 21, art. 25 (offering at least a 
mechanism by which to discover and remedy instance of child labor), and U.S.-
Singapore FTA, supra note 24, ch. 17, art. 17.7(1)(d) (providing that children shall be 
protected through the enforcement of domestic child labor laws). 
 133 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI (granting the Ministry of Labor the 
authority to institute stiff penalties for Labor Code violations). If the ILO cooperated 
with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry could have instituted penalties for the 
violations that the ILO discovered. Id.  
 134 But see USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (indicating that even if the 
USCBTA's drafters sought to fight child labor, they believed that the ILO effectively 
could have done so using alternate methods). 
 135 See, e.g., First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.1 (describing the 
USCBTA as an agreement that provided solely an incentive structure). The agreement 
contained no punitive measures. Id. 
 136 Cf. Andrew Wells-Dang, Linking Textiles to Labor Standards: Prospects for 
Cambodia and Vietnam, 2-3 (June 2002) [hereinafter Linking Textiles to Labor 
Standards] (asserting that the growth of the Cambodian garment industry may not be 
attributable solely or even mostly to the USCBTA's positive incentives) available at 
http://www.fpif.org/pdf/reports/PRtxt-labor.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). If this is 
true, then there would have been little if any correlation between the trade agreement's 
incentive structure and improved working conditions. Id.  That would include 
women's rights. Id. 
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of employment discrimination that the inspectors found.137 Although the 
Labor Code provided that those guilty of violating the anti-discrimination 
provisions are liable to pay fines, neither the USCBTA nor any domestic 
regulations empowered the ILO to impose those penalties.138   
Furthermore, the monitoring program failed to take any steps to 
equalize the disparity between the number of low-level female employees and 
the number of men in management positions.139 Both the Labor Code and the 
                                                 
 137 See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (showing that 
the inspectors found that forty-seven factories received a suggestion to ensure that no 
worker had to pay a fee in order to get a job, while only forty-seven percent 
complied). Fifty-four factories received a suggestion to ensure that the piece rate was 
set at such a level to permit a worker of average ability working normal hours to earn 
the minimum wage. Id. Twenty-one percent complied. Id. Eighty-seven factories 
received a suggestion to ensure that ninety days maternity leave is provided, with half 
pay for workers who had worked at least one year. Id. Fifty-one percent complied. Id. 
Fifteen factories received a suggestion to ensure that workers were not subject to 
negative changes in their contract status when returning from maternity leave. Id. 
Eighty percent complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. 
One-hundred ninety-two factories received a suggestion that management should 
ensure that time-off for breast feeding is provided and that workers are aware of this 
right. Id. Twenty-eight percent complied. Id. Nineteen factories received a suggestion 
that management should take steps to address problems related to sexual harassment. 
Id. One-hundred percent complied. Id. One-hundred nineteen factories received a 
suggestion that management should refrain from engaging in indecent behavior. Id. 
Twenty-nine percent complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 
102.    
 138 See Labor Code, supra note 30, arts. 172-76, 182-87, 363 (listing the 
protections that women receive under the Labor Code as well as the penalties that 
discriminating employers will suffer for violating those provisions). A typical penalty 
consists of a fine of thirty-one to sixty days of the base daily wage. Id. art. 368. 
However, only the Ministry of Labor has the power to impose this penalty. Id. at 359.   
139 See Hall, supra note 36, at 158 (explaining that labor violations in the garment 
industry will have a disparate impact on women because of the overwhelming 
numbers of women working for men). According to one interview that Hall 
conducted, a European consultant for the garment industry discussed Chinese male 
managers' relationships with their Cambodian female employees, 
They really don't like Khmer women at all. Joke 
[sic] about them being ugly and stupid and lazy. 
They keep complaining about how the women 
here don't work as hard as women in China or 
Malaysia, and how they don't want to do over 
time . . . They say if they paid these women more 
money they would gamble it away, or just get 
drunk . . . I've seen these men hit and shout at 
women, calling them fucking whores, and 
slapping them on the face. Then they laugh about 
it, joking with each other.  
Id. at 159. 
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USCBTA were silent on this issue even though critics of Cambodia’s garment 
industry have argued that resolving this imbalance significantly would 
improve living standards and working conditions.140 In this regard, the 
USCBTA failed to compensate for inadequacies in the Labor Code’s 
provisions.141 
 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS: CONNECTING GLOBALIZATION 
WITH POVERTY REDUCTION  
 
A.  THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE WORKS 
 
Future trade agreements should offer incentives for compliance, such 
as the increased quotas that were critical to the USCBTA.142 Although the 
quotas that served as the backbone for this plan disappeared on January 1st, 
2005, Cambodian officials claim that they will continue with factory 
monitoring operations because of the financial benefits that the trade deals 
have brought to the national economy.143 Since the quota system for textiles 
has ended for WTO members, future trade deals in quota-free industries 
cannot replicate the program exactly, but they certainly can offer the benefits 
of enhanced trade that accompanies transparency and stability.144  
 
B.  FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS REQUIRE ADEQUATE LABOR 
LEGISLATION  
 
Future trade agreements may have to confront weak domestic labor 
laws.145 The drafters of the USCBTA generally avoided this problem because 
                                                 
 140 See SG Report: Cambodia, supra note 58, ¶ 116 (discussing the alarming 
instances of discrimination against women, especially violent incidents). 
 141 See Linking Textiles to Labor Standards, supra note 136, at 2 (asserting that 
the ILO was unable to overcome many other challenges to the Cambodian labor 
environment). For instance, internal corruption, a lack of resources, and a weak 
judicial system has resulted in gross under-enforcement of the Labor Code, which is 
why the ILO needed to compensate in some degree for these inadequacies. Id. 
 142 See, e.g., USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (creating a prototypical 
incentive structure that should be studied, modified, and then replicated). 
 143 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 9 (explaining that textile quotas disappeared for 
Cambodia when it joined the WTO).  
 144 See id. at 9, 16-17 (describing the many reasons why Cambodia has chosen to 
continue adhering to the ILO inspections even though the quota system has ended, 
including the commercial benefits that flow from consumer confidence in labor-
friendly garments). Polaski argues that future trade agreements can replicate the 
USCBTA program through the use of positive incentives. Id. at 17. However, Polaski 
leaves unaddressed the merits of a hybrid structure that incorporates both positive and 
negative incentives. Id. 
 145 See, e.g., Codigo de Trabajo (El Sal.) (1972)(amended 1994, 2004) (providing 
relatively weak labor protection), available at 
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of Cambodia’s relatively thorough Labor Code.146 Arguably, however, the 
Cambodian experience is similar to countries without comprehensive labor 
laws because of widespread corruption in Cambodia’s judiciary and labor 
ministry, which has resulted in systemic under-enforcement.147 In that regard, 
the Cambodian experience may be similar to countries without any kind of 
labor legislation at all, because the result is the same in both circumstances: 
little or no labor protection.148 To circumvent these and similar problems, 
future trade agreements should include their own labor provisions, articulated 
with the kind of particularity that will create an effective enforcement body.149  
 
C.  NUMEROUS INSPECTIONS ARE CRITICAL TO ADEQUATE 
TRANSPARENCY 
 
Inspections must be sufficiently frequent and thorough to offer the 
kind of transparency that is needed to ensure that the private sector is in 
compliance with labor standards.150 A critical drawback to the USCBTA was 
the small number of inspectors that the parties used to achieve the 
agreement’s vision and the few inspections that the inspectors undertook.151 In 
                                                                                                                    
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/49592/65113/S95SLV01.htm; see 
also Capitalism in the Raw, supra note 66 (explaining that, unlike the USCBTA, 
CAFTA cannot depend on countries, like El Salvador, to enforce their own labor 
codes on the grounds that those labor laws are too lax). 
 146 See generally Labor Code, supra note 30 (providing relatively thorough labor 
protections). The Labor Code relies primarily upon the Ministry of Labor for 
enforcement, which is notorious for under-enforcement. Id. 
 147 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Judiciary on Trial, (June 
20, 2001) (condemning Cambodia's judiciary for corruption and lack of political 
independence), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/06/20/cambod149.htm (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
 148 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-
2004: CAMBODIA, sec. 6(a) (Feb. 28, 2005) (asserting that the Labor Code went 
unenforced in 2004 due to a lack of political will), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41638.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).  
 149 See, e.g., NAALC, supra note 18, Annex 1 (providing a list of labor principles 
that guide the parties' domestic legislative priorities). While this language is merely 
aspirational, it remains more prototypical than the USCBTA, which lacks any guiding 
labor principles. Id. 
 150 See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (explaining that two inspections during a 
four-year time period is insufficient to conclude, infer, or even speculate that 
Cambodian factories abided by anything more than the worst labor standards 
imaginable). 
 151 See INT’L LABOUR ORG., NINTH SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING 
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR, sec. 1.3 (July 2004) 
(reporting that the project, which by the ninth report had included at least 243 
factories, had recruited only eleven inspectors), at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia9.pdf (last visted 
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order to achieve more transparency, there must be more inspectors and more 
inspections.152 Two visits within a four-month period are insufficient to 
ensure that the visited businesses are in substantial compliance with the 
law.153  
 
D.  INDUSTRY-WIDE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IS NOT ENOUGH     
 
The Cambodian example suffered from a severe free-rider problem.154 
The USCBTA allowed working conditions to lag in some areas as long as the 
industry as a whole substantially complied with the law.155 While it may be 
unrealistic to require a higher standard of the entire industry, a better solution 
would have granted preference to firms that participated in the program at 
different levels of compliance.156 For instance, firms that complied the most 
should have had special access to the domestic quota bidding process, while 
firms that complied the least should have had restricted access to U.S. markets 
via the local bids.157 In the absence of quotas, inspectors can rank firms 
according to their compliance with the relevant labor standards and 
recommend the best firms to U.S. businesses and provide a warning to avoid 
the least compliant businesses.158    
 
E.  ADJUDICATION IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT TO ENFORCEMENT 
 
                                                                                                                    
Feb. 4, 2005). However, the small number of inspectors may have been sufficient 
since the program so infrequently sent them to inspect participating facilities. Id.     
 152 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating the need for 
more inspections in order to achieve credible results). 
 153 But see supra notes 70, 72, 79, 82, 88, 98, 119 and accompanying text 
(showing that the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia, two 
mighty super unions, an international trade scholar, and at least two reputable 
journalists proclaimed the ILO program as an exemplary success story on the meager 
basis of two inspections conducted in a four-year time span with methods of dubious 
reliability).    
 154 See supra discussion Part III.A.4 (explaining that the incentive structure 
allowed grossly noncompliant and defiant facilities to trade with the United States). 
 155 See supra discussion Part III.A.4 (proving that the free-rider problem was 
directly related to industry-wide standard). 
 156 But see Polaski, supra note 31, at 17 (eschewing any use of negative 
incentives, which logically would include the sliding-scale approach advocated here). 
 157 See Linking Textiles to Labor Standards, supra note 136, at 3 (arguing that the 
disconnect between factory compliance and quota allocations served as a challenge to 
effective implementation and monitoring).  
 158 See Regina Abrami, Worker Rights and Global Trade: The U.S.- Cambodia 
Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement, Harvard Business School Case Study, No. 9-703-
034, at 15 (Aug. 2003) (arguing that consumer pressure will be strong enough to 
encourage socially responsible business practices). 
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Another means of solving the transparency problems that inhere in 
regulatory models, such as the one that the USCBTA adopted, involves 
incorporating other kinds of legal architectures into the enforcement 
mechanisms.159 Future trade agreements need to pull private companies out of 
the shadows of international law and allow workers to compel their employers 
to comply with labor codes.160 At the very least, there needs to be a public 
forum where employees can present violations of labor laws and where the 
owners can present their side of the story, shedding light on violations that 
inspectors otherwise might overlook.161 An adjudication system might provide 
negative reinforcement that accompanies the positive incentives from 
increased access to U.S. markets.162 
 
It is critical that the public has access to the adjudication system and 
that the employees can obtain effective redress for labor code violations.163 
The lack of redressability was a critical failing of the NAFTA labor side 
agreement.164 For instance, a typical remedy for violations involves merely a 
ministerial meeting between low-level U.S. and Mexican officials.165 By 
contrast to the remedies that NAFTA offered to workers, NAFTA’s chapter 
eleven dispute settlement procedures offered more meaningful protections to 
investors who could obtain financial compensation for violations of the 
                                                 
 159 See, e.g., Laurence Hefler & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of 
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (comparing and 
contrasting different methods of international dispute resolution systems); see also 
John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental 
Law: The Submission Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2001) (arguing for a different method for compliance in NAFTA-
related environmental disputes). 
 160 But see Kolben, supra note 39, at 91 n. 72 (implying that approaches such as 
this, which encroach on state sovereignty, will face significant political obstacles).  
 161 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (showing that the ability to bring a 
lawsuit in an adversarial setting might increase transparency into the administration of 
law law). 
 162 But see supra note 156 (demonstrating the opposition to hybrid positive-
negative incentive structures). 
 163 See Michael Posner, An Open Letter to Ambassador Robert Zoellick, 
(November 26, 2001) (arguing for changes in the USCBTA that would have allowed 
non-governmental actors to play at least a minimal role in the administration of the 
Labor Code), at http://ur.rutgers.edu/news/ACLA/lchrcambodia.htm (last visited Mar. 
5, 2005). 
 164 See Russo, supra note 19, at 112-18 (describing the faults in the NAFTA 
dispute settlement procedures). 
 165 See NAALC, supra note 18, art. 27 (aspiring to redress labor violations 
through ministerial consultations). 
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agreement’s provisions.166 Future trade agreements should adopt an 
adjudication system similar to NAFTA’s chapter eleven, in conjunction with 
the USCBTA regulatory approach.167  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 There is a great need for incorporating labor rights provisions into 
bilateral, multilateral, and regional trade agreements. However, it was only 
towards the end of the last century that governments experimented with 
different types of legal systems to address labor issues. As the debate on this 
matter moves forward, more attention must focus on the most effective and 
appropriate legal architectures for labor rights protection in the trade context. 
The USCBTA was the purest example of a regulatory model that governments 
have used to link trade and labor protection. The weaknesses in a purely 
regulatory model indicate that a different approach may have more success. 
While purely adjudicative models have their own drawbacks, the best 
approach may be a hybrid of the two. A regulatory-adjudicative model for 
labor rights enforcement may be the best way to improve living standards and 
working conditions world-wide. Given the shortcomings of the USCBTA, let 
us hope that this is not the best that we can do. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 166 See generally NAFTA, supra note 17, ch. Eleven (describing the procedures 
by which investors can obtain redress for violations of enumerated investment 
protections). 
 167 See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (revealing the weaknesses in the regulatory 
model alone). 
